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Abstract—Fine-grained hardware protection could provide a
powerful and effective means for isolating untrusted code.
However, previous techniques for providing fine-grained
protection in hardware have lead to poor performance. Legba
has been proposed as a new caching architecture, designed to
reduce the granularity of protection, without slowing down the
processor. Unfortunately, the designers of Legba have not
attempted an implementation. Instead, all of their analysis is
based purely on simulations. We present an implementation of
the Legba design on a MIPS Core Processor, along with an
analysis of our observations and results.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Protection is a long-standing problem in operating systems
safety. With the growing popularity of mobile code, the
proliferation of third-party operating systems extensions, and
the clear dangers of running these extensions in a privileged
context, there is a definite need for better protection
mechanisms.
Recent work on Microsoft’s Singularity[8] project rely on
software isolated processes to provide safety properties. Typesafe languages do provide strong software protection
mechanisms for safety. However, given the frequency of
defects in software systems resulting in vulnerabilities, we
suggest that some additional layers of protection may improve
the situation.
Brian Bershad observed that while software protection
mechanisms provide the most flexible and applicable
protections, “software mechanisms usually rely on hardware as
a foundation to ensure their own integrity, while changes in
hardware protection are usually controlled and limited through
software mechanisms.” [10] We agree whole-heartedly with
this observation, and believe that hardware mechanisms should
be designed and evaluated for providing fine-grained
encapsulation of light-weight objects.
Legba[2] is a hardware design for fast, fine-grained
memory protection. Unfortunately, the original designers have
not yet attempted an implementation. While the design appears
to provide the protection mechanisms required, the design

needs validation beyond simulation. We have attempted to
implement Legba in VHDL to better understand the design
space and to validate the Legba achitecture.
II.

RELATED WORK

The problem of providing fine-grained memory protection
in an efficient manner is not new. Most current processors
provide a partial solution by attaching permissions to pages in
the Translation Look-aside Buffer (TLB).
This has two disadvantages. The lines in a TLB refer to
pages. Thus, permissions can only be as fine-grained as the
page size. For most processors, this is 4KB. Secondly, the
TLB is shared among all processes on the system. We must
either add context tags to the TLB lines, or perform a complete
TLB flush on a context switch.
This solution is also usually limited in the number of
entries. Because the TLB is frequently fully associative and
must be on the processor core (and critical path), the size of the
TLB is minimized to reduce the access time and avoid
lengthening the processor critical path.
Given the inadequacy of current processor architectures for
providing fine-grained protection, research efforts have been
made in new architectures for protection.
A. Software Solutions
A number of software solutions have been proposed to
provide the flexible protections required. While all of these are
useful in their own space, they still rely on hardware for a
foundation.
One method of safely running untrusted code is to use an
interpreter. If implemented correctly, this does provide
complete safety. However, interpreted code is slow and
inefficient. Some studies have found that interpreted code is up
to 100x slower than native machine code. [13] Finally, while a
correct interpreter provides complete safety, proving the
correctness of a large piece of software such as an interpreter is
usually challenging.
Proof-Carrying Code [14] is a much more promising line of
research. A proof of safety is embedded in a program. Before

loading the program, the system checks the proof against the
code and determines whether it is safe to run. This provides
the best of both worlds: the mathematically demonstrated
safety with the speed of native code. Unfortunately, creating
these proofs has proved to be a very difficult problem, and an
automated safety prover is still out of reach.

protection to individual pages, we have no sub-page protection.
Furthermore, the PKR is on the processor critical path. This is
probably the driving force behind the choice of PKR size; a
large, fully associative cache would add significantly to the
processor critical path length.

Type-safe languages [15,9,8] provide another approach.
The language does not provide constructs for violating the
type-safety of object encapsulations. Each component is
software isolated from every other object. The major problem
here is in ensuring that each program is from a type-safe
compiler, and that they each adhere to the software protection
scheme.
Additionally, there is the non-trivial problem of
validating the correctness of a large, complex compiler.

D. Protection Look-aside Buffers
A major innovation in protection management comes with
protection look-aside buffers (PLBs) [4]. With PLBs, we
remove all protection information from the TLB and place it in
a new construct, the PLB.

Software Fault Isolation isolates faults in one module from
impacting another module. One very effective method is
NOOKS, outlined in [16]. NOOKS uses a combination of
automatically instrumented code and memory management
techniques to prevent a defective kernel module from
corrupting the rest of the kernel. However, the memory
management techniques rely on modifying the TLB to restrict
access to memory. While this prevents a defective module
from inadvertently trampling kernel memory by mistake, no
attempt is made to prevent the module from loading a new TLB
and accessing at will. In the words of the NOOKS designers,
“We trust kernel extensions not to be malicious, but we do not
trust them not to be buggy.” This is a valuable design space,
but we are interested in assurance from malicious code, not
merely defective code.
B. Palladium
Palladium [17] attempts to solve the same problem using
existing segmentation and paging hardware in the Intel x86
class of processors. Since these processors support a large
(8,192) number of segments, each with its own privilege level,
as well as near arbitrary size, this seems like a promising option
at first. Unfortunately, at closer examination there are some
significant disadvantages.
These segment protection levels are limited to 2 bits, or
four ordered levels. This is adequate for a very shallow
ordered hierarchy. However, for an arbitrary protection matrix,
we need to be able to support non-hierarchical orderings of
arbitrary depth. In short, a complete subject/object access
control matrix [18].
Palladium also has a significant protection domain
boundary crossing penalty of 142 cycles. While this is not an
insurmountable difficulty, it is possible to reduce the protection
domain boundary crossing penalty.

If we use virtually addressed L1 cache, then the TLB is no
longer necessary for L1 cache operations, and can be moved
off core. This allows us to expand the TLB and increase the
associativity, since it is only used during L2 or lower accesses;
the latency can be masked in the lower level memory access.
Another major benefit is that the PLB is much smaller than
the TLB. Unfortunately, the PLB still suffers from all of the
classical drawbacks of a TLB. It is still fully associative, and
still sits on the processor critical path.
Finally, the classical PLB suffers one more major
disadvantage: the need to perform an associative lookup of an
address without knowing the base address of the object whose
attributes are cached. Thus, when we wish to check the
permissions associated with an address, we need to use the
address to look up the associated memory object in a fullyassociative cache using object base and limit. Having this
lookup in the L1 cache is expensive.
E. Mondrian Memory Protection
Mondrian Memory Protection [7] incorporates the concept
of the PLB and adds an additional optimization, the sidecar.
Sidecars are cached protection bits applied to any register
capable of containing an address (including the program
counter).
When first a register is used to address memory, the
memory permissions are not known. However, once the
permissions are known, they are cached in a sidecar to the
register. Future accesses check the sidecar first; if the address
object is still the same, the sidecar permissions are used instead
of consulting the PLB for permissions. This removes the PLB
from the processor critical path.
In the case of mondrian memory protection, the sidecar
contains:
•

the base of the last memory access

•

the limit of the last memory access

•

the rights of the last memory access

C. Itanium
Itanium provides a Protection Key Register (PKR) [19].
This PKR is a 16-entry fully-associative cache. Since the
cache lines do not have context tags, the cache must be flushed
on every access.

As no context tags are included, the sidecars must be
flushed on each context tag. PLB entries do include context,
allowing us to share cache lines between different protection
domains using different permissions.

Since the PKR is separated from the TLB, TLB cache lines
can be shared between different protection domains, with
different access permissions. However, since the PKR still ties

Mondrian memory protection still uses a classical PLB, and
suffers from the major disadvantage of the PLB: the associative
lookup.

III.

OVERVIEW OF LEGBA

Legba provides fine-grained memory protection by
combining features of many disparate memory protection
schemes.
Mondrian memory protection comes closest to meeting our
needs, except for the associative lookup. That is, we have an
address, A, which falls between some object O’s base B and
limit B+L. Then we should apply the permissions of object O
to accesses to address A. The problem becomes: how do we
associate address A with object O? In mondrian, the address is
checked in L1 cache.
In the case of Legba, we no longer store address objects in
the PLB – in L1 cache – by base and limit, but by Object
Identifiers (OIDs). This also allows us to add a level of
indirection from the data cache lookup to the actual protection
information, permitting us to share cache lines between
multiple protection domains.
To add this indirection, Legba supplies a data cache with
the usual data, tags, and stats fields; as well as an OID used to
index a second cache, the Protection Key Cache (PKC), with
protection information. To avoid extending the processor
critical path, the PKC is placed in the pipeline stage following
the data cache.
To facilitate the sharing of data cache lines between
different protection domains, the PKC is indexed by both the
OID from the cache and the current Protection Domain
Identifier (PDID). See Figure 1 [2].
Legba uses four permission bits: e(X)ecute, (S)witch,
(R)ead, and (W)rite. X, R, and W are self-explanatory; S is
iscussed in more detail under the new instructions for Legba.
Legba also includes sidecars à la mondrian memory
protection. However, in the case of Legba, the sidecars do not
contain the full base+limit, but just an OID. During data
lookup in the cache, an authoritative OID is returned. Sidecar
content is validated by comparing OIDs.
Finally, Legba also adds two new instructions: BranchLinked-Locked (BLL) and Switch-Load (SL), for managing the
current PDID.

IV.

IMPLEMENTATION

Our implementation is based on the MiniMIPS [11]
implementation of the MIPS core. The MiniMIPS is a standard
5-stage (IF|ID|EX|MA|WB) pipelined architecture with support
for exceptions, pipeline stalls on branches, and no cache or
virtual memory (and thus no TLB). We found that Legba
adapted very well to implementation on the MiniMIPS.
In our implementation, an attempt to access memory in
violation of policy generates an exception. In the MiniMIPS,
an exception is handled by an immediate jump to a global
exception handling address. Our implementation does not
actually include the exception handler, which we consider to be
outside our scope.
The pipeline stall on branch required one minor change to
our BLL/SL instruction implementation, detailed below.
The lack of a TLB means that we cannot mask the latency
of the associative lookup of the OID by performing this in
parallel with address translation. Since most processor
architectures today do have a TLB, we consider this to be an
unusual case that does not invalidate the assumption that the
latency can be hidden with a parallel lookup.
In general, we believe that the Legba architecture can be
added to almost any processor architecture without great
difficulty, although we only offer the anecdotal evidence of our
own implementation as proof.
A. Pipeline Changes
Our implementation made very few changes to the pipeline
structure.
We added several new components to the pipeline. The
major addition is the Protection Key Cache, or PKC. See
Figure 2 [2]. Also, since the MiniMIPS had no cache, we also
added the instruction cache and data cache to the pipeline, for a
modified Harvard architecture. In most architectures, this is
unnecessary, since a separate instruction and data cache are
commonly included.
We also found it necessary to add some additional registers
to the pipeline. We added a PDID (Protection Domain ID), to
represent the current execution context, and a Protection Key

Figure 1: Cache and PKC relationship

Figure 2: PKC location within Pipeline
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OID (16)

Table Register, which will be discussed under the memory
hierarchy.
Finally, it is worth detailing exceptions in the MiniMIPS.
When an exception is raised, all stages prior to the exception
are filled with NOPs, and a signal is sent to the PC register.
The next address to be loaded in the instruction fetch stage will
be the address of the exception handler.
For our
implementation, we used address 0xFFFF0000.
B. Instructions Added
Legba requires the addition of two new instructions:
BRANCH-LINKED-LOCKED (BLL) and SWITCH-LOAD (SL). To
simplify our implementation, we changed the BLL to a simple
JUMP instead of a BRANCH-LINKED. That is, we do not save
the old address on a stack, etc. Instead, we treat the BLL much
more like a syscall or trap instruction. The exact semantics are
as follows:
On reading a Branch-Linked-Locked, the processor sets up
for a normal JMP, passing the address to the MiniMIPS jump
logic. The jump logic handles relative branch computation and
stalling the pipeline.
We also add an additional pipelined signal which passes
through to the Instruction Fetch stage with the jump
information. This signal notifies the IF stage that the next
instruction must be SL.
On load, we have additional logic we have added to the IF
stage that checks the signal and the next instruction. If a BLL
is not followed by SL, an exception is raised.
Before executing the SL instruction, we verify that we have
(S)witch permission to the object in which it resides. When
executed, SL takes the OID of the object containing the SL and
loads it into the pipelined PDID register.
The actual validation of the X and S permissions are
addressed in our discussion of the PKC component. It is
sufficient to note for now that we must have X permission to
the object in which both the BLL and SL reside, and S
permission for the object in which the SL resides.
One point not discussed in the original design of Legba is
whether a naked SL should generate a permissions exception.
We elected to allow this case. Thus, SL may be encountered in
any point in the program. However, given that the only way
this can happen is if we “fall through” from one object space to
another, or by jumping to an SL by a normal JMP (where a
BLL could be used), this seems to be mostly irrelevant.
In summary: our implementation adds two instructions to
the MiniMIPS instruction table, the BLL and SL. We also add
logic to the IF stage to verify that SL follows BLL (component
is_SL). Finally, we add logic to the ID stage to load the new
PDID into the pipeline (component pdid_update). Since
the PDID is only used in the ID and WB stages, we latch it in
stage ID as a register, and pipeline it through to the WB stage
as a normal pipelined signal.

Perm.
(2)

Valid
(1)

Figure 3: Sidecar contents
C. Sidecars
Legba implements Mondrian-style sidecars, but instead of a
base+limit identifier, we use an OID. Because of concerns in
the caching components, we made our OIDs 16 bits.
Our sidecar adds 19 bits to the storage for each register (see
Figure 3). Note that we only have 2 bits of permissions,
despite having 4 distinct protection bits. This is because we
have two distinct types of registers. The PC is only ever used
to execute or switch, never to read or write. The other general
registers are only ever used to read and write, never to execute
or switch. Thus, we can save 2 bits on each sidecar by only
caching the relevant bits.
Our implementation has the following semantics:
1.

On context switch (SL instruction), all sidecar “valid”
bits are cleared.

2.

When a register is used in a lookup, real permissions
are validated for that lookup in the cache and PKC.

3.

As a side benefit to checking these permissions, we
also route them back to the register used in the lookup,
as a sidecar update. This update may also change the
OID of the register.

The implementation requires only a few changes to the
existing MiniMIPS: add storage bits to the register, and
“update” and “flush” lines to the register files. We also add
pipelined signals to track which register is being used in a
memory access, so that sidecar updates are routed to the correct
register. This adds no logic to the top level, just an additional
signal for the pipeline.
The sidecar updates take the exact same form as the sidecar
data itself, where the “valid” bit is used to assert an update.
D. Memory Hierarchy
Our cache architecture is a 4-way modified Harvard
architecture. (See figure 4) While the addition of two more L1
cache components runs the risk of more frequent stalls, the
original designers believe that PKC misses should be rare. We
discuss this assertion further in our evaluation section.
An important point not addressed in either the original
Legba design or in our own implementation is cache
coherence. Given that we now have 4 separate cache
components in L1, we believe it would be most efficient to
implement request bus snooping to maintain coherence.
Additionally, bus snooping allows us to monitor changes to
permissions in the lower level Protection Key Table (PKT),
updating the relevant PKC and/or cache. The original Legba
design also mentions the possibility of object re-numbering;
this could be an acceptable way to implement this.

PKC outputs:
•

sidecar updates (routed to the relevant register)

•

exception line (on access violation)

•

stall (on cache miss and lower-level lookup)

Our PKC also has one other output used in managing the
data dependency mentioned above, detailed in our evaluation
section.
On a PKC lookup, we first check the cache OID against the
sidecar OID. If they match, and the sidecar is valid, we can
skip the PKC lookup and used the sidecar permissions.

Figure 4: Legba Memory Hierarchy in the MiniMIPS
architecture
In our actual implementation, we completely ignore the
issue of cache coherence and recommend this to future
investigators.
1) L1 cache
Our L1 cache scheme has 4 different components.
However, the instruction cache and the data cache can be
implemented by the same component, as can the two Protection
Key Caches (PKC’s).
Our actual cache was never intended to be synthesizable,
and was implemented in behavioral VHDL with some delay
statements. The problem of implementing cache has long been
solved, and we use the behavioral VHDL to model a real cache.
Our cache model is for n-way set associative cache. Since
the MiniMIPS does not have virtual memory, it is physically
addressed and physically tagged. We chose to make it 4-way
set associative, but do not attach significance to this number.
We also add an OID to each line, but all logic for selecting this
OID is in the L2 cache, not L1. Our L1 performs simple
caching only.
We do encapsulate our L1 cache inside logic to handle an
unexpected data dependency, explained in our evaluation
section. This logic is not present in the original Legba design.
Our PKCs are significantly more complicated.
We encapsulate our actual PKC inside a set of logic to
handle sidecar optimizations, pipeline stall management, and
protection checking.
A PKC check requires the following inputs:
•

OID (from cache),

•

sidecar from register, with OID, permission bits,
and validity,

•

current PDID (from pipeline),

•

access type request (from the instruction, e.g.,
Read, Write)

Otherwise, we must look in the PKC. The PKC is a setassociative cache, indexed by OID. We used the PDID as the
tag in our lookups. Thus, indexing by OID returns a set of
cache lines; using the PDID, we can do a parallel check of the
set of cache lines, searching for the correct one. Since our lines
are very small (PDID + permissions = 18 bits; adding
replacement algorithm stats, a line is probably 20 bits), our
parallel lookup is very fast, and we can afford to have a fairly
large PKC.
In either case (sidecar or PKC lookup), the protection
information is routed with the requested access information to a
small protection check component (permchk).
This
component issues the actual exception to the external pipeline.
During a PKC miss, we need to look up the information
from lower levels. However, the protection information is
actually stored in a PKT in DRAM. This information is not
stored in the same format as in our PKC. The PKT (described
under DRAM) is a two-level hash table, so a lookup of
protection from lower levels involves two distinct reads.
We implemented this as a 3-state FSM within the PKC.
Normally, the FSM is in the idle state. On a miss, we begin
reading from the first hash table (READ1). After receiving the
first read, we can read from the second level (READ2). The
actual read is from L2, so we may have varying stalls, based on
the availability of L2 and the hit rate within L2 for the PKT.
Since the PKT lines (described under DRAM) are not in the
same format as in L1 and L2 cache, a read from line will return
protection information for potentially multiple protection
domains.
In our implementation, we discarded this
information. An alternative implementation would be to store
this information in adjacent lines within the PKC object set.
We do not consider this particularly valuable. The line will
still be cached in L2, so subsequent reads will not need to look
to DRAM, and since OIDs may share sets if the PKC is small,
we do not wish to evict one object’s protection in favor of
another.
In summary: our L1 cache is fairly standard. Our PKC is
the most custom component in our implementation, and does 2
lookups on a cache miss, due to the 2-level PKT.
2) L2 cache
Since we now have a 4-way shared L2 cache, we use a
simple L2 controller to arbitrate access.
Our arbiter
(L2_controller) always gives automatic priority to the

request from farthest along the pipeline. Since prior stages
cannot advance even if they have the information from L2, this
simplifies pipeline management.
We used this memory architecture as a shortcut. We
believe that a better implementation would involve a bus, and
bus snooping by each caching component to detect updates to
locally cached information. However, particularly in the case
of the PKC, it is difficult to see how the PKC can recognize
that a change to the PKT has been made. While indexing from
the PKTR can be detected, the PKT is a 2-level hash table, and
detecting a modification to the second level is difficult.
As is typical, we have an address signal, a data bus for data
transfer in or out, a set of input enable signals (chip, read, and
write enable), and an output enable signal (data ready). Our
L2 cache lines are shown in Figure 5.

Data

OID

Figure 5: L2 cache line

2.

On a miss, we perform two tasks in parallel.
a.

Index the address into the OLB,
obtaining an OID for the data. (On an
OLB miss, we generate an exception.)

b.

Issue the read to DRAM, waiting until
DRAM is ready. Note: we assume writeback cache, so the data is read into L2
cache even on a write.

3.

The data is copied into L2 cache. The stats are set,
and the OID is appended to the data line.

4.

Finally, any pending read/write is done, and
d_rdy is asserted.

Note that since both L1 and L2 cache have the same cache
line format, the data and OID are returned on one big bus
which is redirected directly into the relevant cache line.
3) DRAM
Our DRAM is implemented in totally non-synthesizable
behavioral VHDL with explicit delay statements. Our DRAM
consists of a large array of words. We make no effort to do a
realistic “progressive delay” in our DRAM, but just apply a
constant penalty.

Our L2 cache contains two components not usually found at
L2: the TLB and a new component, the Object Look-aside
Buffer (OLB).

The DRAM interface is very similar to the L2 interface.
We have an address, a data bus, the usual trio of input enable
signals, and an output enable signal.

Since the MiniMIPS has no virtual memory, we do not
actually implement a real TLB. We did mark the point where it
would exist in the L2 cache, and place a dummy “passthrough” component.

Stored in DRAM is our actual authoritative protection
information, the PKT. Because the protection information is
stored in memory, updates to the PKT can be made by the OS
by simply updating the table in memory.

Choosing to locate the TLB in L2 cache is possible because
we envision Legba being implemented in an architecture with a
virtually addressed L1 cache. Since protection has been moved
out of the TLB and into the PKC, there is no longer any need to
keep the TLB on-core, in the L1 region.

The PKT is a two-level hash table where the first table is
addressed by (hashed) OID, and the second level by (hashed)
PDID. See Figure 6.

We do implement the OLB. The OLB is a fully associative
array of the available objects with base and limit. A lookup in
the OLB takes an address and searches all object in parallel to
return the OID in which the address resides. Since all cache
lines within the L2 cache already contain an OID, only lookups
to DRAM require searching the OLB. Thus, we mask the OLB
latency behind the DRAM access latency.
The remainder of L2 cache is fairly normal, non-associative
cache. Once again, we have implemented this as behavioral
VHDL using delay statements for simulation. No attempt is
made to make the L2 cache data portion synthesizable.
The sequence of operations in the L2 cache is as follows.
Arbitration is left out of this sequence, as it should be clear
without discussion.
1.

A request comes in to read/write to some address,
along with assertions on c_en and rd_en or
wr_en.
a.

If the data is present, it can be
read/written immediately.
d_rdy is
asserted.

Figure 6: Legba two-level hash table
The base address of the PKT is stored in a new register, the
PKTR. This register is used by the PKC to perform any
lookups of permissions, but no other caching constructs need to
be aware of the PKTR.

The PKT top level is in cache-line sized rows. Since we
assume that our OIDs will be sequentially allocated by the
operating system, we use a simple 16-bit to 8-bit XOR fold for
a hash. This should serve to reduce collisions, particularly if
OIDs are allocated in a packed manner; that is, lowest available
first.
Each row in the top-level of the PKT has a number of
“tries” for hash function collisions. In this initial prototype
implementation, we take no steps to avoid hash table collisions
beyond our trie limit.
Within each top-level PKT entry, there is a set of OIDs and
memory addresses. Each address points to the Protection
Domain Hash Table (PDHT) for that OID.
Within the PDHT, there are a set of PDIDs (one for each
trie), and a set of 4-bit permissions associated with each one.
The lookup process is actually driven by the PKC on a PKC
miss. The lookup process is:
1.

Read
the
cache-line
PKTR+(OIDhigh+OIDlow).

sized

row

at

2.

Perform a parallel check of each entry for the
correct OID. In cases of multiple matches, use the
first. (Since we use 0 for the OID of empty
entries, this is possible.)

3.

From the associated address A, read the cache-line
sized row at A+(PDIDhigh+PDIDlow).

4.

Perform a parallel check of each entry for the
correct PDID. Use the associated bits.

One useful trait is that we can make each of the secondlevel PDHTs a separate object, and give read/write permission
over that object to the owner of that object.
E. Changes for Virtual Memory
MiniMIPS does not have virtual memory, and no TLB.
Because of this, much of the complexity and design points of
Legba are unused. However, most modern processors do have
some form of virtual memory.
Legba is best suited to virtually addressed L1 cache. This
allows us to remove the TLB from the processor critical path,
and to perform OLB lookups in parallel with TLB lookups.
Other architectures, while workable, have less ideal choices.
For example, for a physically addressed L1 cache, we need
to perform a translation step before a lookup. In this case, we
would want our OLB to be at the top level, in the L1 cache.
Since our OLB is fully associative and sized to hold all
possible 16-bit values, this is a massive addition to the on-core
processing.
To implement Legba on a system with virtual memory,
certain changes need to be made.
First, the TLB should be real, located in the L2 cache as we
have it placed. Second, all memory lookups need to be tagged
with an Address Space Identifier (ASID). This is how most
modern virtual memory capable processors differentiate

different address space data in virtually addressed cache. [1]
Thus, we add the ASIDs to the cache.
This introduces the “synonym” problem. We now have
differently addressed lines in a single cache that both refer to
the same location in memory. Efficient ways of dealing with
the synonym problem is an open area of research; most
architectures avoid this problem by requiring each address
space to be wholly distinct, and any shared memory is bundled
into a special “global” ASID.
However, one of the major advantages of Legba is that we
can share cache lines between different protection domains –
and different address spaces. Using this scheme now requires a
different data line for each address-space view of the same
data. In this case, Legba is best applied to intra-address space
access control, not inter-address space access control.
V.

EVALUATION

During our implementation, we encountered several
difficulties that were not addressed by the original designers.
We also clarified some areas of concern, and can place
reasonable constraints on several architectural properties.
A. Timing Concerns
1) Critical Path
Our implementation makes it clear that Legba does not
significantly extend the critical path.
First, in most processors, the critical path is established by
the EX stage of the pipeline. Legba has no impact on the EX
stage.
Secondly, in the case of sidecar hits, the PKC has no impact
on either the WB stage or the ID stage. With sidecar hits, the
maximum path length of the PKC is a comparator (not equal,
of the same width as the OID), 4 AND gates, 2 OR gates, an
inverter and a latch. We find it improbable that any critical
path could fail to exceed this.
Thirdly, in the case where the critical path is established by
the MA stage, our critical path is lengthened by a single AND3
gate.
Finally, for the case where the critical path is established by
the IF stage, the critical path is lengthened by only an inverter,
a comparator (equals, of instruction width), and an AND gate.
In all cases, we think it is clear that Legba does not
significantly impact the processor critical path. Any timing
impact from Legba will come from cache misses and pipeline
stalls.
2) Frequency of Stalls
Legba contributes to more frequent pipeline stalls in several
ways.
First, by adding an OID to the cache lines, Legba reduces
the available size of the cache line. Likewise, the PKC takes
valuable real-estate on the processor core and reduces the
available space for cache. Reduced cache size will always lead
to some level of increased miss rate. However, this miss rate

cannot be determined from design, but requires experimental
evaluation.

signaled wr_ok. If the next instruction is a memory access,
we stall the pipeline until the write permissions are resolved.

Simply by adding two caches for protection information,
Legba adds an additional source for cache misses and pipeline
stalls. While we expect PKC misses to be rare compared to
data cache misses, this cannot avoid increasing cache miss
frequency. Indeed, since we now have 4 caches competing for
access to L2, we can have increased stall times from L2 cache
contention.

One optimization that appears to be available is to perform
the write immediately if we discover that the sidecar
information is valid and allows writing. Since the sidecar
information is validated by comparing the sidecar OID with the
cache OID, it seems we can avoid the pipeline stall by checking
this in the MA stage.

3) Additional Memory Accesses
Aside from increased miss frequency, a cache miss in
Legba is potentially more expensive.
On a cache miss from the PKC, we need to index into a
two-level hash table. Since this is potentially as much as two
DRAM lookups, the stall time is greatly increased, particularly
in view of the fact that other processors do not even have a
PKC.
In most cases, we think it is probable that L2 will contain
the bulk of the top-level portion of the PKT, so we expect most
PKC misses to require an L2 lookup followed by a DRAM
lookup. We do not expect the protection information from the
PDHT to ever be found in L2, since the only time it is loaded is
when loading the L1 PKC. Thus, unless we flush from the
PKC but not from L2, this information will always be found in
the PKC, or loaded from DRAM.
Fortunately, we expect PKC misses to be rare. We expect
that there will be a limited number of active objects at any
time. Since the PKC cache line is approximately 20 bits long,
we can expect to hold a large number of object protection lines
without substantial cost. Since we would expect normal use to
include a small number of tightly clustered object, it should be
rare to see many new objects accessed (from different
protection domains) in rapid succession. Finally, the addition
of sidecars removes the PKC from the critical path. In some
cases, it is even possible for the sidecar to hit when the PKC
would miss.
B. Unexpected Data Dependency
The original Legba design in [2] contains a flaw. When
attempting to write to L1 data cache, we must first lookup the
associated OID and send it to the PKC for permissions
checking. However, the PKC is in the next pipeline stage!
This problem is inherent in the Legba architectural model.
For read operations, this is unimportant. We can read the data,
discover that read access is unavailable, and generate an
exception. The data is thrown away on exception, so there is
no protection impact. For writes, we cannot complete the write
until we have validated write permission.
We earlier alluded to a data dependency problem in the data
cache and PKC design.
In our discussion of their
implementation, this point was omitted for clarity.
We developed a workaround for this problem by adding an
instruction lookahead from the EX stage to the MA stage.
When the MA stage receives a write operation, it uses a 2-state
FSM to hold the write until the PKC in the next stage has

This is not the case. Our data cache must first read the data
to obtain the OID. Only after this read can we test the sidecar
validity. Unless the processor critical path is more than double
the time of a data cache access, we cannot both read the OID
and write the data all in a single pipeline stage without
noticeably lengthening the critical path.
We consider this problem to have very limited impact on
performance. Modern compiler technology is well able to
handle re-ordering instructions to avoid known processor
hazards. In this case, the only hazard is on a memory write
followed immediately by a memory access. Unavoidable cases
should be vanishingly rare. In those few cases that do apply,
the penalty is only a single cycle stall.
C. Protection Key Table
The PKT as implemented has a limited multi-trie system for
handling collisions. While our reasoning is that, due to the
order of OID allocations, collisions in the PKT will be limited;
we must consider the possibility that our expected usage
patterns are incorrect.
Large numbers of collisions would require extending the
trie system. However, extending the trie system arbitrarily has
the potential to make PKC miss time unbounded. Further, an
operating system error has the potential to produce a circular
trie list, locking the processor in a hardware memory walker
loop. We consider this an unacceptable compromise.
Additional experimental data is necessary before the PKT
collision rate can be properly established.
Significant
additional hardware design would be required to manage
extension of the existing trie system.
D. Object Look-aside Buffer
The OLB is effectively a form of very non-standard content
addressable memory. In our implementation, we only have 16bit OIDs; nonetheless, this requires 8 bytes per OID for base
and limit, for a total OLB size of 512KB.
Since the OLB is fully associative, searched in parallel on
every lookup, this requires two comparators for each line,
along with a large aggregation network. We consider the cost
of this OLB to be excessive.
The OLB is not a standard CAM, and CAM prices do not
apply because of the two-comparator test. However, if we
judge from existing CAM architectures, a megabyte of CAM is
currently around $10. If we assume that doubling the number
of comparators roughly doubles the cost, a rough ball-park
figure for this component is $20. With any additional cooling
capacity, a realistic total cost could be $30-$50. [12]

While this sounds like a minimal cost, the consumer market
has shown a trend toward considering cost above performance
(and functionality) when purchasing memory. We consider it
unlikely that consumers would be interested in this additional
expense without significant demonstrable gain.
VI.

FUTURE WORK

A. Experimental evaluation of PKT collisions
Our analysis, like that of the original Legba designers,
suggests that collisions in the PKT should be rare. We believe
that some experimental analysis should be performed to
determine the real extent of collisions.
This requires developing a model of a hypothetical
operating system using Legba as a basis for protection
mechanisms. In the original Legba paper, the authors used
user-level code and assigned each variable a different OID.
We consider the impact of the operating system to be nonnegligible, and we believe that objects must be more sanely
delineated.
For example, we could develop a system where a memory
allocator controlled its own memory. Allocation requests enter
through a call gate; some amount of memory is selected for
allocation. That memory unit’s PKT contents are reassigned to
provide read/write access to the requesting thread.
Developing a design of an entire operating system around
the concepts of fine-grained intra-address space protection is a
non-trivial task, and a project we consider well worthwhile
under its own merits.

This is still different from segmentation as applied to
modern processors such as the Intel architecture. Segments
normally have a set of limited hierarchical privilege levels. We
would change this by supporting constructs allowing a
completely arbitrary set of access control lists.
This is a significant redesign of the original Legba scheme.
We do not believe it is appropriate to simply graft this change
onto Legba. On the contrary, we think a change of this nature
should necessitate a complete redesign of Legba, because
additional optimizations – or problems – may present
themselves.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Having implemented Legba, even on a limied architecture
such as the MiniMIPS, we believe that this architecture
represents a promising direction for research. With some of the
limitations we have seen, we do not believe legba is ready for
production use in a real microprocessor. However, continuing
research is strongly indicated.
In particular, we recommend that two directions toward
future work be explored:
First, there is a need to explore operating system design in
an arena where fine-grained protection exists.
Second, there should be a redesign of Legba where
programs must present OIDs for object access.
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